Joshua Lohka
The Taliban takeover and toppling of the Kabul government during the summer of 2021 marked the end of twenty years of foreign intervention within the Afghan state (PBS NewsHour, 2021) permanently shifting the monopoly on force within Afghanistan. Under the regime change to Taliban rule, Afghanistan has borne witness to a near universal lack of international response, notably multilateral interventions that characterized the response to the Al-Qaeda attacks of 9/11. In contrast to the significant lack of multilateral initiatives posed by the international community, Afghanistan’s new position within the global theater has led to unilateral action being taken by west and east based regional actors; each in efforts to gain favour, security, stability, and assert dominance over the Taliban regime. This paper looks to examine the missing multilateral responses to the Taliban, alongside the varied unilateral responses by state actors. Lastly the paper aims to offer clarity on the Taliban situation through the lens of realist theory, observing how a self-help state model for global politics develops the response we see today concerning Afghanistan.
The Mujahadeen
To understand both the multilateral and unilateral responses to the Afghan situation, there must first be an understanding of the history of Afghanistan and the Taliban regime. The Taliban, first known as the Mujahadeen took power within Afghanistan during the Cold War era, after successfully defeating a Soviet invasion of the Afghan state. The initial Taliban government would be brought down by a U.S. led coalition, with the goal of eliminating Osama bin Laden and ending the Taliban-supported Al-Qaeda presence within the state (PBS NewsHour, 2021). The intervention into Afghanistan beginning in 2001 would continue to persist until 2021 where following the path set forth by former president Trump, acting president Joe Bindern would end the U.S. intervention and presences within Afghanistan; (PBS NewsHour, 2021) leaving the newly formed democratized government and Afghan national army to defend the state without external aid. It would be this decisive choice that would lead to the Taliban entering Kabul and ending the democratic government’s rule over the nation in fewer than 10 days (Washington Post, 2021).
The Missing Multilateral Response
When observing the international response to the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan there exists a notable lack of response by the nations across the globe, markedly in the realm of multilateral responses. Ignoring general statements by nations condemning the Taliban for enforcing what many view as human rights abuse, there exists little unifying action between nations addressing the Taliban regime. To understand this lack of action we must first understand the waning support from nations taking part in the initial invasion of Afghanistan post 9/11. The invasion of Afghanistan, administered primarily by the United States served a dual purpose; End the Taliban regime while eliminating Osama bin Laden. To this end the U.S. led coalition was largely successful, the Taliban were removed from power in Kabul, while Osama bin Laden was killed by American forces (PBS NewsHour, 2021). However during this time of multilateralism beginning in 2001, nations aligned with the NATO-ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) coalition began to seek more unilateral approaches. As Justin Massie explains within Why Democratic Allies Defect Prematurely: Canadian and Dutch Unilateral Pullouts from the War in Afghanistan; nations such as Canada who had sent relatively large coalition forces to Afghanistan, by 2004 sought to distance themselves from the potential risk involved by combat and occupation within afghanistan (Massie, 2016). The risk aversion to conflict is attributed primarily as a breakdown of what Massie denotes as the “elite consensus”. The elite consensus being the agreement between those in power on how to proceed within a given situation such as that found within Afghanistan (Massie, 2016). We can then understand both Canada’s and the Netherlands drift from multilateral combat coalition members to unilateral Afghanistan training forces, as a result of local political sentiment within each nation with regards to potential electoral risk-reward evaluations performed by politicians (Massie, 2016). The risk-reward cycle faced by politicians looking to gain re-election serves as a powerful force, one as Justin Massie developes; might remain the cause for nations primarily seeking greater unilateral paths thus granting increase independence, as well as nations seeking to remain free from conflict zones due to an anti conflict sentiment within the local state selectorate (2016).
Un-unified Unilateralism
Moving from the multilateral to unilateral there develops a varied response pattern by both western actors and regional powers alike. Afghanistan under the Taliban represents an unknown variable with the potential to host new terrorist organizations as it once did in the past. This potential offers a security risk to regional powers within the south asia region. It is understandable then that nations such as Pakistan and China’s relations to the Taliban government contrast that of the west, where it is argued the Taliban threat is less severe (Pantucci & Basit, 2021). Where western states such as the U.S and Canada condemned the Taliban government, failing to recognize it as the official de facto organization (Government of Canada, 2022), while employing economic sanctions (US Department of the Treasury, 2022). Actors to the east have made steps to recognise the Taliban in efforts to gain favour within the Afghan-Taliban regime. As authors Saroj Rizwan Khan and Tabinda Sabah state; “the regional embodiment of Taliban has been recognized by China and Russia, as […] Pakistan had has welcomed the new formed Taliban government” (pp.11-12). The recognition by eastern regional powers serves to solidify Taliban legitimacy while offering potential benefits to outside powers, such as access to large reserves of rare earth metals within the Afghan soil (Nandan, Chauhan, & Kumar, 2022, p.2). Omitting potential material wealth, there exists potential security gains that might be salvaged from Taliban control in Afghanistan. As explored within “THE GEOPOLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF AFGHANISTAN FOR INDIA IN THE 21st CENTURY” Pakistan acting as a “pivotal actor in the Afghan peace process” might enjoy the potential to develop extremist individuals within Afghanistan, used to destabilize Indian power within the region; particularly within the contested region of Kashmir (Nandan, Chauhan, & Kumar, 2022). Additionally this potential remains plausible as D.Nandan et al. note that; “generally Pakistan backed the Taliban regime in this condition because the Taliban is ideologically reliable and military resilient against growing Indian influence” (2022, p.2). Where the global community lacks in collective multilateral commitment concerning the Taliban, there exists little shortage of individual states entering into unilateral focused diplomacy with the Taliban as seen with China, Pakistan and other regional powers, along with western actors condemning the terrorist organization (Government of Canada, 2022).
The Lens Of Realism
It is clear through the scrutinization of global events regarding the Taliban re-taking of Afghanistan, that within the global community there exists a considerable lack of multilateral action taken against the Taliban offensive. Likewise it is noted that long before the ISAF withdrawal, nations within the coalition began an unilateral drift (Massie, 2016). To understand the lack of intervention on a multilateral plane as well as the many differing approaches unilaterally being taken by nations to the Taliban state. We must consider the Taliban rise to power under the self-help lens of realism theory. Realism, focusing on the self-help state that nations find themselves acting within, allows a greater understanding of the individual actions taken by states throughout the Afghanistan timeline. Structural realism, notably, offers the greatest depth to this understanding. In contrast to other dominant theories within the realm of political science, structural realism pertains to the focus on how structures influence nations (Walts, 1997), this might be found on the international level or within local politics as noted by author Justin Massie. Where the Dutch unilateral shift within the ISAF coalition might be explained by political elites attempting to remain in favour with the electorate, thuse removing their nations from direct military intervention. All while undertaking training roles within Afghanistan in an effort to enforce international perceptions of the Netherlands as a reliable nation (Massie, 2016). Structural realism equally explains for the lack of multilateral intervention. Focusing on a nation’s electorate, if a given nation’s voting population holds reservations about committing resources to a potential war, then there exists little political incentives for that given state to enlist resources for the purpose of ending a Taliban regime. As discussed by authors Rashid and Gu concerning the U.S., “anti-war and anti-involvement movements that shaped the public opinion in favor of ending forever wars abroad” (2022, p.8) were instrumental in the U.S. decision to withdraw from Afghanistan (2022). Moreover Rashid and Gu offer increased incite to the U.S. withdrawal commenting that ending operations within Afghanistan “could free the military equipment currently held in Afghanistan, allowing them to be sent back to the Indo-Pacific Theater.” (2022, p.11). This direct potential to repurpose military forces to the Indo-Pacific; serving to enforce displays of force, acts as a textbook example of realism—states seeking their own self interest, notably in relation of power—and is mirrored with the unilateral approach used by China’s foreign policy concerning Afghanistan. Outlined within The ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan: perceptions and reactions of regional powers authors Destradi, Godehardt, and Frank, note “China’s government [is] actively seek[ing] to integrate Afghanistan both regionally and bilaterally.” (2012, p.4). The integration of China diplomatically with Afghanistan as covered within the latter section of the paper, again reflects realist tendencies similar to the U.S. potential to redeploy its forces from Afghanistan to greater threats within the Indo-Pacific (Rashid, Gu, 2022). Both U.S. and Chinese directions concerning Afghanistan center around gaining regional power and displaying that power abroad; a keystone to realist theory. By observing the global response to the Afghan situation through realist-means, the global response to the new Afghan era is made unambiguous. With realism it is understood that states chase self interests that lead to their own improvement, explaining why states have yet to commit resources to fight back against the second Taliban government in a multilateral effort. More-so however, the unilateral actions made by states to either limit their involvement in Afghanistan (Messi, 2016) as witnessed in the West and Europe, or attempt strategic diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime (Destradi et al., 2012) as regional powers have done in the east, all serve to support realist theory; as a lens to coherently un-puzzle the response to Afghanistan.
The Taliban rise in Afghanistan left the world in a state of multilateral inaction, and unilateral divergence. Fueled through state self-interest understood through realist theory, nations across the globe experienced unilateral shifts both as a response to a reclaimed Taliban regime as well as local political structures such as selectorate demands, and dynamic political threats. With the nearest action that might be considered multilateral; being statements of condemnation by an IGO series of experts (OHCHR, 2022). Still, nations under the self-help guiding hand of realism, advanced their unilateral approaches contrastingly; between regional powers—offering diplomatic recognition—and Western-European nations refusing to recognize the Taliban as the official Afghan government. Each choice made by the global community, unilateral or otherwise can be connected through realism. The notion that states will actively take on tasks as long as those tasks increase the power, security, or relative standing position of the state remains a prominent display within each reaction to the Taliban’s resurgence into power.
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