Joshua Lohka

A New & Evolving Arctic

The high arctic is a dynamic arena, once considered politically stable and neutral from the conflicts that encapsulate the globe. However, in light of recent events, be it receding sea ice and the opening of new contested trade routes, or breaches of international law as well as the remilitarization of regional bases, the Arctic has entered into an era of destabilization. As the world shifts back into a multi-polar order,  no longer dominated by US hegemony, Arctic states must react – adapting to this new world – or risk losing valued Arctic sovereignty.
In the face of President Trump’s shifting stance on collective security agreements1 and withdrawals from the global stage, as well as threats posed by increased Russo-Sino cooperation and militarization within the Arctic region, this article will examine the prospect for a so-called Trans-Arctic Alliance2, uniting key Western Arctic states under a collective security agreement aimed at filling the gap left by a missing NATO Arctic policy. Through an examination of the key threats posed by Arctic and sub-Arctic actors, notably China and Russia. As well as investigating possible Arctic resources and current state shortcomings, a comprehensive overview of the Arctic can be understood. Following this overview, this article will demonstrate how a possible alliance may look, based on shared values, Arctic foreign policy, and a shared history of military cooperation and defence.

Arctic Background

Guided by discussions from member-states of the Arctic Council3, the Arctic region has sustained as an environment often described as ‘high-north, low-tension’, defined by the Council’s ability to cooperate regardless of ongoing conflicts outside the Arctic region. Made up of 8 permanent members (Canada, USA, Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia), the Arctic Council acts as a forum for Arctic states to engage in cooperative talks on issues such as search and rescue, climate change, and indigenous collaboration and representation3. Relatively successful as international bodies go – due in-part to the forum’s exclusion of security topics – the Council’s efficacy remains in a state of political flux, a potential canary for future conflict.
The past decade saw a relatively stable Arctic, this would shift in 2019 as Russia began flying Arctic patrols following a “30 year hiatus”4. However, regional cooperation remained high and would continue between Arctic Council members until 2022, with Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. Following the 2022 invasion, members of the Arctic Council moved to pause all formal cooperation with Russia under the Russian chairship of the Council, with states such as Canada stating that there can be no “business as usual” with Russia as it violates international law in Ukraine5.

The New Arctic Era

The ‘new’ era of Arctic geo-politics would begin, marked by 3 key themes:

  • Russian remilitarization and increased enforcement of Arctic claims.
  • Heightened involvement by China via Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and physically through military patrols in the Arctic region.
  • A daunting lack of a unified NATO strategy within the Arctic region.

Over 20 military bases make up Russia’s Arctic bastion-system of defence, each falling under the new Northern Fleet Headquarters, an additional military district developed to focus funding and equipment into the Russian controlled Arctic. The status awarded to the Arctic by its new district designation is not to be underestimated, as it represents a distinct pivot in Russian military priorities, elevating the high-north in line with the main-land Russian districts4. Although effective, Russia’s remilitarization campaign is not without challenges, due in-part to the state’s ostracized position within the Arctic Council, Russia has been forced to seek funding for its military capital-projects, finding creditors in the form of the Chinese state4. Often considered an alliance of skeptical-partners4 China’s stake in Russia’s Arctic investments affords it new access to Arctic waters. Where once, Russia arctic officials sought to block China’s acceptance as an Observer State within the Arctic Council. Now, it is not uncommon for both nations to sail patrol ships or fly jets together within Arctic air space, at times entering NATO state’s sovereign Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)6 7 8.
China – advertising itself as a near-Arctic state – not only gains a new ally through its funding of capital, but potential entry to a newly accessible Northern Sea Route (NSR), a key emerging trade route that – when ice free – can cut down shipping times from Europe to Asia by two weeks. A new route to Europe remains particularly interesting to the PRC (People’s Republic of China) as trade tension remains high within the US administration, causing Chinese trade goals to shift towards the EU9.
The combined threat of increasingly friendly Russo-Sino cooperation within the Arctic represents a technological gap that Western nations continue to fall further behind. With estimates placing NATO countries 5 and 10 years behind China and Russia respectively – regarding Arctic development and military capabilities4. This capability gap is enforced by a substantial lack of unified NATO policy regarding the Arctic, and potential long-term strategies within the region. Although Western allies have increased the frequency of Arctic war games – doubling those hosted by Russia in 20204 – these remain set individually, nation-by-nation, with the last NATO wide war game hosted by Norway occuring in 20184. Seeking to avoid alliance regionalism10 and Russian provocation, NATO’s limited stance on the Arctic region remains a considerable detriment to Western security within the region.

A Region of Uncovered Opportunity

Relatively untouched by major industry, the Arctic (specifically its seabed) remains one the last great sources of raw energy producing commodities, as well as swaths of unmined rare earth minerals. Current estimates place potential unharvested Arctic oil at 13% of the globe’s untouched reserves with Arctic natural gas making up to 30%. Accordingly, nearly each nation has shown interest in Arctic mineral and resource extraction5 11 12 13 14 15 16, with 4 of the 6 main oil and natural gas basins subsiding within NATO aligned state’s EEZs17. Although the amount of Arctic territory under dispute remains minimal, actors such as China, and Russia regularly antagonise neighboring EEZs, with the US – having not signed onto the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – simply not recognizing EEZs officially. This has developed into multiple situations where Chinese dual-purpose research vessels5, Russian naval patrol ships18 and US officials have each failed to recognize Arctic states’ sovereign waters, be it EEZs, Canada’s Northwest Passage (NWP) or Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR)19.
As the polar ice continues to melt, and predictions place ice free summers as early as 2030, Arctic sovereignty remains crucial, particularly to Canada and Russia concerning claims to the aforementioned NWP and NSR respectively. Combined, both virgining trade routes have the potential to lower shipping costs by 74%20. As such both Canada and to a greater extent Russia have made trade-route protection an important aspect of Arctic diplomacy, as outlined in Canada’s Arctic foreign policy5, and Russian mandates that ships entering the NSR seek permission prior to entry, and pay a service fee for route access.

New Arctic Alliance

A dedicated security agreement focused within the Arctic would be the first of its kind within the region, however it is not without precedence. With many of the Arctic states holding close military ties, both through shared histories such as the US, Canada, and the UK, as well as through NATO, seen now with nations such as Denmark and newly admitted NATO members Sweden and Finland. Precedence for a potential Arctic alliance does not emerge solely from historical military cooperation, but from ongoing and actively developing initiatives, such as the recently founded Joint Nordic Air Command (JNAC), developed between Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden21. A joint military initiative bringing together 250 plus combat aircraft between the four nations in an effort to consolidate defensive regional hard-power and security.
As Arctic states continue to form “regional mini-bloc[s]”10 with their neighbors, it is key to consider what a wider Alliance might look like; though observations on foreign policy, shared values, historical cooperation, and current events, a potential outline of states emerges, these being:

  • Canada, Denmark, Iceland, UK, Sweden, Norway, and Finland.

These seven nations present prime candidates for a new Arctic alliance, each state holds shared values concerning the protection of democracies, the recognition of each other’s sovereignty claims, and are already involved in joint military activities and information sharing. Examining each nation’s foreign policy multiple shared pillars emerge, the first of which is an acute admission of the growing Russian regional-threat – noted explicitly within Canadian Arctic policy5 – what’s more is the existence of a common theme expressed by nations to seek increased bilateral security commitments, particularly expressed by Norway, Denmark, and the UK11 14 16. With four of the seven nations calling for increased cooperation regarding Arctic defence (CAN, DEN, NOR,GBR) there exists a clear desire and potential for a new defence pact. Although not entirely aligned militarily – favouring a more neutral Arctic region12 13 – Iceland and Finland continue to share values and strategic goals alongside their Arctic neighbours, considerably so in the realm of resource extraction. Each of the seven proposed states have expressed an interest in exploiting resources within their Arctic EEZs (with the UK seeking resource partnerships)16, furthering the commonality that each state shares within each other, through a near Arctic monopoly on trillions of dollars worth of oil, gas, and rare earth minerals.
Of note within the proposed states is the inclusion of the UK and the exclusion of the US. Concerning the UK, the GIUK Gap (Greenland-Iceland-UK) remains one of two primary entrances into the Arctic, as such it is prudent that an Arctic alliance already aligned regarding values and goals should include the UK to maximize security surrounding the gap. The US however is more complex. Although a powerful ally and well developed militarily, the recently elected Trump-2 administration has shifted the US stance on collective security, as a consequence to repeated remarks that collective security under NATO’s article 5 is not guaranteed, as well as administration calls to annex both Canada and Greenland22; there is no longer a consistent view among the international community that the US constitutes a reliable ally23. Furthermore the US would need to reach a common conclusion regarding sovereign waters, particularly those of Canada’s NWP, an area within the Canadian EEZ, that the US has long claimed as an international waterway – similar to the NSR19. Admittedly beneficial on paper, with current events considered, US inclusion into a new Arctic alliance would bring in a partner, whose differences outnumber their shared values.
Such a potential organization of states may take up a multitude of forms, however it can be assumed that such an alliance would look back and learn from past joint ventures such as the JNAC, past Arctic war games such as Operation Nanook24, and the shared NATO history enjoyed by each proposed member. The exact layout of such a monumental shift in global Arctic power can only be imagined by the heads of state that develop the program, whether the alliance remains unitarily focused on military-defence, or whether the alliance considers Arctic trade and resource extraction – enabling a unified front on Arctic resource use as well as the joint monopolization of one of two key trade routes (NWP) within the Arctic archipelago.

Conclusion & Personal Takes

Gone is the era of high-north, low-tension. As the world pushes pass the quarter-century-mark, conflict remains ever-present south of the Arctic Circle, and with the renewed wave of militarization of the European mainland, and the Russian Arctic, the risk remains that a misunderstanding within one of the world’s most fragile ecosystems might result in the next great conflict to plague the globe. Should the West wish to match Russian aggression, and Chinese Arctic pursuits, a unified front is necessary, in an ideal world this front would simply be NATO, however, in the ever-anarchic system that is international politics ‘simple’ is rarely attainable. NATO remains relatively impotent within the Arctic, leaving security to the Arctic states alone4. Without NATO a Trans-Arctic Alliance remains one of few viable alternatives, and with Russia’s so-called Special Military Operation ongoing in Ukraine, European and North American allies exist on a chest clock, slowly losing time. For now the Russian bear is focused elsewhere, but this will not continue indefinitely. So long as belligerent resources are poured into Ukraine, Russia is limited in its ability to further develop the Arctic, ergo; should the west wish to make a move, they have only so-long as it takes for the Russian military complex to shift focus and rearm. A process that may take less time than one thinks.

Footnotes

  1. Boynton, S. (2025, March 6). Trump blasts NATO’s usefulness, says U.S. won’t defend “delinquent” members. Global News. https://globalnews.ca/news/11070038/trump-nato-delinquent-members-defence-usefulness/
  2. Sfraga, M. (2025, May 5). The Transarctic Alliance is Key to US National Security. High North News. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/transarctic-alliance-key-us-national-security
  3. The Arctic Council. (2023). The Arctic Council. Arctic Council. https://arctic-council.org/
  4. Perez, C. (2020b, December 15). Military Buildup and Great Power Competition (A. Carlson & D. Johnstone, Eds.). Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/15/arctic-competition-defense-militarization-security-russia-nato-war-games-china-power-map/#cookie_message_anchor
  5. Global Affairs Canada. (2025, March 24). Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy. GAC. https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/publications/transparency-transparence/arctic-arctique/arctic-policy-politique-arctique.aspx?lang=eng
  6. Bye, H.-G. (2021, September 15). US Coast Guard Ships Encountered Chinese Warships Near the Aleutians. High North News. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/us-coast-guard-ships-encountered-chinese-warships-near-aleutians
  7. Bye, H.-G. (2024, August 20). China and Russia With Joint Air Patrol off Alaska: First of Its Kind in the Area. High North News. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/china-and-russia-joint-air-patrol-alaska-first-its-kind-area
  8. Edvardsen, A. (2024, October 4). China’s Coast Guard on First Patrol in the Arctic With Russia. High North News. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/chinas-coast-guard-first-patrol-arctic-russia
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